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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY, 
a c o r p o r a t i o n , 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , ] 
v s . •! 
MAUREEN NELSON, 
D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t , ] 
and ] 
KEITH R. NELSON, d / b / a AAA 
ELECTRIC SERVICE, and KEITH R. ) 
NELSON, an i n d i v i d u a l , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
B R I E F 
C i v i l N o . 8 6 - 0 0 5 0 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did t h e l o w e r Cour t e r r i n d i s m i s s i n g Maureen Nelson a s 
an i n d e m n i t o r from l i a b i l i t y upon an i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t b e c a u s e 
t h e i n d e m n i t e e , Amer ican Bonding Company f a i l e d t o g i v e Maureen 
Nelson n o t i c e of t h e f a c t t h a t b o t h t h e p r i n c i p a l , AAA E l e c t r i c 
S e r v i c e a n d A m e r i c a n , had a s s e r t e d s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r a c t c l a i m s 
a g a i n s t t h e o b l i g e e , and A m e r i c a n f u r t h e r c o m p r o m i s e d t h o s e 
c l a i m s f o r a n e t sum o f 7% of t h e t o t a l c l a i m s a l s o w i t h o u t 
n o t i c e t o Maureen N e l s o n . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
T h i s was an a c t i o n upon an i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t f o r 
l o s s e s c l a i m e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t , who , a f t e r t a k i n g 
o v e r two (2) c o n s t r u c t i o n j o b s , where AAA E l e c t r i c S e r v i c e (AAA) 
was d e c l a r e d i n d e f a u l t upon t h e j o b s , w h i c h t h e o b l i g e e , t h e 
F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , (FAA) t h e n f i n i s h e d . The FAA, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t h e n r e f u s e d t o pay m o n i e s due upon t h e c o n t r a c t s and f o r 
a s s e r t e d e x t r a s t h e r e o n , a l l e g i n g v a r i o u s damage c l a i m s , a l l of 
wh ich were compromised by a p p e l l a n t w i t h o u t n o t i c e t o Maureen 
N e l s o n , t h e r e s p o n d e n t . A p p e l l a n t t h e n made demand upon M r s . 
N e l s o n f o r i t s a l l e g e d l o s s e s . S u i t f o l l o w e d i n w h i c h M r s . 
N e l s o n d e n i e d any l i a b i l i t y b e c a u s e of l a c k of n o t i c e and t h e 
f a i l u r e of t h e a p p e l l a n t s t o p r o p e r l y s e t t l e t h e v a r i o u s c l a i m s 
and a p p e a l s . 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Thi s m a t t e r was t r i e d t o t h e H o n o r a b l e Kenneth R i g t r u p 
commencing on F e b r u a r y 2, 19 8 1 . At t h e end of a p p e l l a n t ' s c a s e , 
J u d g e R i g t r u p g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t M a u r e e n N e l s o n ' s M o t i o n t o 
D i s m i s s and removed h e r from t h e l i t i g a t i o n . The t r i a l c o n t i n u e d 
f o r an a d d i t i o n a l t e n d a y s a s t o t h e v a r i o u s c l a i m s and c o u n t e r -
c l a i m s b e t w e e n p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t K e i t h R. N e l s o n . The 
F i n d i n g s of F a c t and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and Judgment of t h e C o u r t 
were u l t i m a t e l y e n t e r e d on December 13 , 1985 . 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
From t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t e s t i m o n y , t h e f o l l o w i n g 
F a c t s were adduced a t t r i a l : 
The a p p e l l a n t s sued upon an i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t s i g n e d 
on S e p t e m b e r 1 7 , 1 9 7 3 , by b o t h t h e d e f e n d a n t s , K e i t h R. N e l s o n 
a n d h i s w i f e , M a u r e e n N e l s o n , f o r l o s s e s i n c u r r e d i n a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n j ob f o r t h e FAA a t t h e D e n v e r a i r p o r t upon a p e r -
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formance bond issued by the p l a i n t i f f s a t the r eques t of the 
defendant, Keith R. Nelson only, almost two (2) years af ter the 
indemnity agreement. The losses sued upon were incurred in 19 76. 
The prayer of the compla in t was for $87,667.37. (R. 1-5) No 
notice of a claim of such magnitude was given to Maureen Nelson 
u n t i l the alleged claim had been determined by the appel lants in 
1979. (R-2, 3 and 4) . 
Dean Vanatta, an attorney for the appel lants was sworn 
in and t e s t i f i e d as the only w i t n e s s for the p l a i n t i f f s o t h e r 
than Maureen Nelson. (R-83). 
Mrs. Nelson, who was a housewife at the t ime, recal led 
s ign ing documents such as the indemnity agreement in 1973, but 
presumed that those documents were only for the Sal t Lake Airport 
job bond, a job not involved in the i n s t a n t c a s e . (R. 198, L. 
13-25, R. 199, L. 1-25). 
Keith and Maureen Nelson had l i ved a p a r t from each 
o the r from July of 197 5 u n t i l October of 1976 and then were 
d ivorced . (R-196, l i n e s 5-13). Mrs. Nelson had no knowledge 
whatsoever of any bond which had been issued for the Denver job. 
(R.200-201, l i n e 1), so t h a t she was not aware of any problems 
with the Denver job or any d i s p o s i t i o n of c o n t r a c t r i g h t s t h a t 
AAA E l e c t r i c had in the Denver job u n t i l 1979 a t which t ime she 
received ce r ta in l e t t e r s from the appel lant and took them 
to her d ivorce a t t o r n e y , Sandy Dolowitz . (R. 202, l i n e s 1-13). 
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Thus from 1973 u n t i l 1979, a period of six (6) yea r s , Mrs. Nelson 
never heard anything from the bonding company u n t i l they made 
demand on her to pay the sum of $27,000,00. (R. 202, l i n e s 14-
19). Mrs. Nelson, up to the t ime of the d ivo rce had been a 
housewife a l l of her l i f e and had not worked o u t s i d e of the home. 
(R. 203, l i n e s 14-25), Since the d i v o r c e , she had worked as a 
hostess in a r e s t au ran t , a clerk in a department s tore and as an 
office worker for a department s t o r e . (R. 204, l i n e s 5-12). 
Exhibit P-7, the only notice sent to Maureen Nelson, i s 
a copy of a l e t t e r da ted November 19, 1975, from American Bonding 
Company to Maureen Nelson. Mr. Vanatta did not send the l e t t e r , 
but received copies of the l e t t e r as the surety company's legal 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d i r e c t l y from American Bonding Company. This 
l e t t e r reminded the indemnitors tha t they had signed the blanket 
indemnity agreement and then gave not ice "that claims and s u i t s 
have been f i l e d a g a i n s t American Bonding Company" and t h a t the 
s u r e t y expected the Nelsons to abide by the terms of the i n -
demnity agreement . Mrs. Nelson did not r e c a l l r e c e i v i n g t h i s 
l e t t e r and did not have i t in her f i l e of correspondence which 
she had saved regarding t h i s mat ter . (R, 201), 
Appel lan t sen t Exh ib i t 7 by c e r t i f i e d and r e g u l a r 
m a i l . I t r ece ived the c e r t i f i e d cop ies of the l e t t e r back 
marked "unclaimed." I t s f i l e s do not show t h a t the r e g u l a r 
mail was returned. After the not ices were given, various con-
4 
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versa t ions took place between Vanatta, Keith Nelson and Bob Rich 
who was the s u p e r i n t e n d e n t for AAA E l e c t r i c upon the Denver-
S t a p l e t o n job . (R. 94-95). 
The only c la ims which had been made a g a i n s t the 
payment bond as of the sending of Exh ib i t 7 were by subcon-
t r a c t o r s by the name of Westbrook, Ortiz E lec t r i c and S ie r ra -
Cre te . The Westbrook c la im was f i l e d in S t a t e Court and l a t e r 
d i smissed with no lo s s paid because of f a i l u r e to f i l e in 
Federa l Court which had e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of M i l l e r Act 
c la ims. (R-112 and 113). The Ortiz claim was dismissed af ter the 
p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y withdrew and no f u r t h e r a t t o r n e y was 
appointed. (R-113f l i nes 10-22). 
Out of the c l a ims f i l e d by Westbrook and O r t i z , the 
appel lants suffered no loss except for t h e i r a t torney 's fees 
incurred in defending those ac t ions . (R-179, l i nes 20-24; R-262 
l ines 14-25). However, these at torney fees were never segre-
gated from the balance of $18,000.00 in attorney fees claimed. 
When Mr. Vanat ta , who began r e p r e s e n t i n g American 
Bonding Company in October of 1975, f i r s t attempted to find out 
the f a c t s of the case and rece ived the f i l e from American 
Bonding Company, he attempted to c a l l only Mr. Nelson, i n i t i a l l y 
wi thout s u c c e s s . There was no evidence t h a t he a t t empted t o 
c o n t a c t Maureen Nelson. (R-87, l i n e s 12-19). He knew as e a r l y 
as October 1975 tha t Keith Nelson was having mar i ta l d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
5 
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(R. 256, l i n e s 6-13)• 
Vanatta subsequently learned tha t both of the cont rac ts 
upon which AAA E l e c t r i c was performing had been dec l a r ed in 
defaul t by the FAA as of October 31, 1975. No notice of t h i s fact 
was given to Mrs. Nelson. However, AAA E lec t r i c , through t h e i r 
a t torney had met with contract ing o f f i ce r s for the FAA and had 
been given an extension for the completion of both jobs* (R-88, 
l i n e s 7-21) . Vanat ta f i r s t con tac t ed Keith Nelson on November 
13, 1975. (R-89, l i n e 4) . In t a l k i n g to Mr. Nelson about the 
c la im t h a t had been made by one of the s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s , Mr. 
Nelson t o l d him t h a t the s u b - c o n t r a c t o r making the c la im had 
refused to work because the FAA had wi thhe ld $92,000.00 from 
AAA for over twenty (20) days in v i o l a t i o n of i t s c o n t r a c t and 
t h a t he in tended to sue the FAA because i t was p u t t i n g him 
behind schedule on both of the c o n t r a c t s because of r e f u s a l to 
pay on time. (R-89, l i ne s 18-24). 
Meetings took place on December 30, 1975, (R-99, l i ne 
2) between the FAA, Mr. Vana t t a , Mr. Nelson, Mr. Nelson 's 
a t t o r n e y and Bob Rich, a s u p e r i n t e n d a n t for AAA. T h e r e a f t e r , a 
t a k e o v e r a g r e e m e n t , P - 6 , was s i g n e d be tween t h e FAA, t h e 
appel lants and Mr. Nelson. This agreement assigned a l l contract 
r i g h t s of AAA in the c o n t r a c t s wi th FAA to a p p e l l a n t s . (R-
100, l i ne s 2-5). The appel lants then took over the prosecution 
of work upon the con t r ac t s . (R-102, l i n e s 8-13). 
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After the appel lants took over the job, as of February 
of 1976, Mr. Vanatta was con tac ted in February of 1976 by the 
c o n t r a c t i n g o f f i c e r s and t o l d t h a t t he Government was 
c o n s i d e r i n g d e c l a r i n g the a p p e l l a n t s in d e f a u l t upon t h e 
con t rac t s . (R-104, l ines 4-7). Whereupon Mr. Vanatta conferred 
with Mr. John Brown, the job s u p e r i n t e n d e n t and Bob Rich about 
the delay in the e l e c t r i c a l work. (R-104, l i n e s 19-21). A sub-
s t i t u t e c o n t r a c t o r , Weekly E l e c t r i c , was h i r ed d i r e c t l y by 
appel lants to complete the e l e c t r i c a l port ion of the work af te r 
c o n s u l t a t i o n s wi th Keith Nelson and Bob Rich. (R-107, l i n e s 9-
24). Thereafter , the job was completed under FAA suprevision by 
Weekly E l e c t r i c , f i n a l i n s p e c t i o n was made and s e t t l e m e n t 
n e g o t i a t i o n s begun on both the Government's c la im for r e p r o -
curement costs on the ILS contract and for actual damages because 
of AAA Elec t r i c ' s al leged default and AAA's claim for equitable 
adjustments, more commonly known as ex t r a s , p r ior to the bonding 
company takeover and for c e r t a i n e x t r a work t h a t had been done 
af te r the bonding company takeover. ( R - l l l , l i nes 11-22). 
From December 15, 1975 to January 15, 1976, Mr. Vanatta 
was involved in n e g o t i a t i n g the takeover agreement which was 
signed between the FAA, appel lants and Keith Nelson on 1-15-76. 
(R. 225, l i n e s 1-4). The takeover agreement provided for a 45 
day completion, yet the bonding company in a s i t ua t i on where the 
s u b c o n t r a c t o r s were c la iming t h a t AAA had not paid them and 
7 
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AAA's claim was that the Government had not paid extras due AAA, 
did not pay out any money to any subcontractors on the job until 
eleven (11) days after the takeover agreement was signed. (R. 
226) . 
Both Keith Nelson and Bob Rich had many repeated 
discussions with Dean Vanatta regarding actions the FAA had 
taken, ie: they wrongfully withheld progress payments based 
upon a claim that AAA had failed to submit payroll evidence to 
the Government and they had refused to pay any of the extra 
claims filed by AAA. (R-115, lines 9-17). The various claims of 
AAA for extras before bonding company takeover and the claims of 
the bonding companies for extras and the decision of the 
Government to declare the appellants in default were appealed to 
the Board of Contract Appeals for the U. S. Government by Mr. 
Vanatta. However, Vanatta settled all of the claims prior to 
the hearing before the Board of Contract Appeals. (R-120). 
There were four or five negotiation meetings involving 
the various contract claims with the FAA and James Kruetz, AAA's 
attorney was present in the earlier sessions; however after the 
first or an early session, Mr. Kruetz bowed out because he was 
not being paid. (R. 129, lines 7-16). 
A letter was mailed to Keith Nelson on August 9, 1978 
by the appellants with a copy to his attorney, Jim Kruetz, 
advising them of a settlement conference with the FAA and 
8 
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requesting that Mi , Nelson approve and sign a proposed settle-
ment agreement which tl le appellants had negotiated with the 
Government. (R-129-130). A second letter was sent to Mr, Nelson 
on the 24th day of August, 1978 by Exhibit * lo such letters 
w e r e sent to the defen d a r 11 : „ M a i i r e e n Nelso Nelson refused 
to sign such an agreement unless he was relieved of any liability 
to the appellants. (R. 131-132). The appellants ultimately 
settled the claim for extras and money due upon the c original 
contract for the total sum of $30,000.00 without the signature 
of Mr. Nelson and without any notice to Mrs. Nelson. (R. 145, 
lines 3-6, R. 263-264). 
The net effect of the settlement by Mr. Vanatta on 
behalf of the appellant!:) w * . t h a 1 the bonding 
company received the sum of $21,26* - compromise of some 
$140,00 0.00 in extras in claims made ov the defendant, Keith 
Nelson clba AAA Electric and the appellant s, but no claim, by claim 
analysis could be made by Mr. Vanatta in his testimony before the 
court. (R. 150-152). Once again, no communication was ever made 
to the defendant, Maureen Nelson, of any intent to compromise any 
such claims, or for that matter, that such claims existed. 
There was due upon the original contracts at the time 
of settlement, the sum of $63 ,410.00 which the FAA refused to 
pay the appellants because of an FAA claim for reprocurement 
(cost ) f p r • : c: i 11: i i I g m a t e r i a 1 s ) and act i J a 1 d a m ages, ( R-15 3) (R-
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142-143). (See Findings of Fact). Mr. Vanatta could not, a t the 
t r i a l r e c a l l what comprised e i t h e r of the claims for reprocure-
ment costs or actual damages. No evidence upon these issues was 
produced a t the t r i a l even though the t r i a l was cont inued for 
s i x t e e n (16) days. (R. 300). The reprocurement c o s t s were 
comprised e s s e n t i a l l y of a claim where the U. S. Government had 
declared tha t the appel lants were in fact in defaul t a f ter they 
had taken over the c o n t r a c t . The a p p e l l a n t s had appealed t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r finding and the issue of reprocurement cos t s , but then 
s e t t l e d for no value to that c laim, giving the FAA fu l l value for 
t he unproved reprocurement c o s t s and c la imed damages. (R.160-
162). 
Mr. Vanat ta could not remember whether or not he was 
l icensed before the Department of Transportat ion Contract Appeals 
Board to which Board the e x t r a reprocurement c o s t s and damages 
were appealed. (R. 167). 
Exhibit 1, the blanket indemnity agreement, contained 
an ass ignment of a l l c o n t r a c t r i g h t s of the p r i n c i p a l s and AAA in 
any cont rac t s and was stamped as recorded at the Department of 
State for Colorado on January 9, 197 6. The issue as to whether 
or not the p l a i n t i f f s disposed of the contract r i gh t s of AAA in a 
commercially reasonable manner was raised a t t r i a l , as indicated 
by counsel for the appel lan ts . (R. 210, l i ne s 13-25). 
The a p p e l l a n t s were owed $61,410.00, the ba lance due 
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upon the contracts which the FAA contended they could withold 
because of aii equal amount of reprocurement costs and other 
claimed actual damages, together with anot 1 1 er § ] 42,000.00 in 
claims for extras which totalled roughly $200,000.00 which the 
appellants settled for a total of amount of $30,000.00, (R. 272-




THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED 
THAT NOTICE BE GIVEN TO THE INDEMNITOR 
The trial Court found that Paragraph 11 of the 
Indemnity Agreement, which was Exhibit TD-I in fact waived 
notice of default; however, the trial Coti r also found that 
Paragraph 13 of the Ii idemi ii ty Agreeirn * ' * It idemnitors the 
right to use the surety to litigate any claim or demand involved 
and request that a defense be asserted. The language of 
Paragraph 13 is as follows: 
"Thirteenth: The surety shall have the right to 
adjust, settle or compromise any claim, demand, 
suit or judgment upon the bonds, unless the 
principle and the indemnitees shall request the 
surety to litigate such claim or demand or defend 
such suTt, or to appeal from such judgment, and 
shall deposit with the"~surety, at the time of 
such request, cash or collateral satisfactory to 
tne surety in kind and amount to be used in pay-
ing any judgment or judgments rendered or that 
may be rendered, without interest, costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees including those of 
thT surety." (Emphasis added) 
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The t r i a l Cour t , in i t s o r a l r u l i n g , found: 
" impl ic i t in tha t p a r t i c u l a r provision i s some 
requirement of not ice , otherwise the provisions 
of the Indemnity Agreement would have no meaning." 
I t i s c lear that the pla in terms of the above paragraph 
gives the p r inc ipa l and the indemnitors the r igh t to request the 
surety to l i t i g a t e claims or demand or to defend s u i t s or appeal 
from judgments upon the d e p o s i t wi th the s u r e t y of s e c u r i t y . 
If, however, the indemnitor had no notice or knowledge whatso-
ever of the fact tha t s u i t s or judgments or tha t appeals could 
be made from c e r t a i n j u d g m e n t s or a p p e a l s or s u i t s , t he 
indemni to r would have no way of e x e r c i s i n g the r i g h t which 
Paragraph 13 gives to the indemnitor* Thus if a notice requ i re -
ment i s not implied from the terms of Paragraph 13, the r i g h t s 
which i t gives the indemnitor become t o t a l l y meaningless. 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r i g h t given by Paragraph 13 
i s seen when i t i s considered tha t the appel lants compromised 
some $200,000.00 in c l a ims for monies c la imed due upon the 
c o n t r a c t p lus e x t r a s a s s e r t e d , for a t o t a l of $30,000.00, or 
r o u g h l y 15 c e n t s on t h e d o l l a r . If t h e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s 
expended by the s u r e t y of $18,000.00 a r e deducted from the 
recovery, there would be a net recovery upon the various claims 
of l e s s than seven (7) c e n t s on the d o l l a r . C e r t a i n l y such a 
r e s u l t c r i e s out for an e x p l a n a t i o n . I t was abundant ly 
apparen t from a review of the t e s t imony of Mr. Vanat ta t h a t he 
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could never explain in de ta i l , on a claim by claim basis, why 
the surety company settled these claims for the sums received or 
what the causal basis was for the claims of the FAA were or what 
items made up the to t a l . (R. 297). 
The only notice sent to Mrs. Nelson was Exhibit P-7, 
which the Court found to be insufficient on i ts face to satisfy 
the requirement of paragraph 13 of the Indemnity Agreement. The 
reason for that was /e:t *y simp] e, i e: II: le ] et /ten* only recited 
generally that claims had been asserted against the appellants in 
connection with the Denver job. The letter did not state who the 
claimants were, the amounts of the claims, the nature of the 
claims, nor more importantly, the peril in which the indemnitors 
found themselves thereafter (R- 287). -.-
Actually, from a canvas of the record, i t is apparent 
that the only claims that were in existence against the surety 
at the time of the notice on November l(*, 1 j S w e r e c l a i m s of 
s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s , a l l of which were s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d w i t h 
no p roved l o s s t o t h e a p p e l l a n t s . Thus t h e n o t i c e g i v e n had no 
b e a r i n g upon t h e l o s s f o r which Mrs. Nelson was b e i n g s u e d . 
The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r found t h a t t h e n o t i c e was t oo 
v a g u e t o a f f o r d r e a s o n a b l e n o t i c e t o j w f a u r e e n N e l s o n t o 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y form any r a t i o n a l b a s i s t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r s h e 
s h o u l d e x e r c i s e h e r r i g h t s u n d e r p a r a g r a p h 13 of t h e i n d e m n i t y 
ag reem en t t• > de f e nd < >i: 1:c : p r o s e c u t e any p a r 11 < ::i i] a i: c 1 a Im t ;ha t <\AA 
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might have had a g a i n s t the U. S. Government which would e i t h e r 
avoid or reduce l i a b i l i t y against her as an indemnitor. (R. 287). 
The c o r r e c t n e s s of t h i s r u l i n g i s q u i t e apparen t because i t was 
c l e a r l y proved by a p p e l l a n t s own w i t n e s s e s t h a t a l l of the 
s ign i f i can t facts of t h i s case occurred several months a f te r the 
sending of P-7 , thus P-7 did not mention the d e c l a r a t i o n by the 
FAA t h a t AAA was in d e f a u l t , t h a t the s u r e t i e s were t h e r e a f t e r 
d e c l a r e d in d e f a u l t ; t h a t AAA a s s e r t e d $140,000.00 in e x t r a 
c l a i m s on the c o n t r a c t ; t h a t AAA or the s u r e t i e s had a d d i t i o n a l 
contrac t claims of over $60,000.00 against which the FAA claimed 
damages and reprocurement c o s t s of an e q u i v a l e n t amount; t h a t 
these claims were heard before a contract ing o f f i ce r ; tha t the 
d e c i s i o n of the o f f i c e r was appea led ; t h a t a l l of the foregoing 
c l a ims were s e t t l e d for a net amount to be c r e d i t e d to the 
indemni to r of approx imate ly seven cen t s on the d o l l a r , l eav ing 
the indemni to r s l i a b l e to the a p p e l l a n t s for a s u b s t a n t i a l 
amount. Written notice of a l l of these matters was given to the 
co-indemnitor, Keith Nelson. 
Where the terms of a c o n t r a c t may be vague, the conduct 
of the p a r t i e s r e l a t i ng to said contract i s persuasive evidence 
of what the p a r t i e s in f ac t meant by the agreement . Zeese v. 
S i e g e l s E s t a t e , 534 P2d 85 (1975), Bu l l f rog Marina v. Lentz , 2 8 
Utah 2d 261 501 P2d 266 (1972). Also, conduct of p a r t i e s in 
c o n f l i c t wi th the c l e a r terms of the agreement may c r e a t e 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an a m b i g u i t y i n t h e w r i t t e n document . B u l l o u g h v . S i m s , 4 00 P2d 
2 0 , 16 U tah 2d 304 ( 1 9 6 5 ) . F i n a l l y , t h e u n d i s p u t e d c o n d u c t o f 
t h e p a r t i e s showing t h a t t h e y i n t e n d e d s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t t h a n 
t h e c l e a r t e r m s of an a g r e e m e n t w i l l be e n f o r c e d r a t h e r t h a n t h e 
t e r m s of t h e w r i t i n g , E i e v . S t . B e n e d i c t s H o s p i t a l , U t a h 638 
P2d 1190 ( 1 9 8 1 ) . 
The f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s a r e posed by t h e f a c t s of 
t h i s c a s e , f i r s t , i f n» :)t i c e was i i ::>t r equ i red by p a r ag r a p 1: I 13 , why 
d i d a p p e l l a n t s s e n d n o t o n l y one (1) n o t i c e ; b u t two (2) n o t i c e s 
t o K e i t h N e l s o n ? They o b v i o u s l y f e l t t h a t some s o r t of n o t i c e 
was n e c e s s a r y u n d e r t h e i r a g r e e m e n t o r t h e y would no t have gone 
t o s u c h l e n g t h s . The s e c o n d q u e s t i o n i s f h a v i n g s e n t a l l t h e 
n o t i c e s t c:> K e 11 h N e 1 s o n, w a s i t s i i c 1 I a I: :i i g 1 I lb u r d e n t o r e q u I r e of 
a bonding company t o have them spend t h e r a t h e r s m a l l amount of 
p o s t a g e and e f f o r t t h a t i t w o u l d h a v e t a k e n t o s e n d p h o t o c o p i e s 
t h e r e o f t o Maureen Nelson? 
A c o n t r a c t of i n d e m n i t y i s c o n s t r u e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
t h e r u l e s f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of c o n t r a c t s g e n e r a l l y . King v . 
N o r t h w e s t Wheel , I n c . r 12 W* a™ 946 532 P2d 1181, The c a r d i n a l 
r u l e i s t o a s c e r t a i n t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s and t o g i v e 
e f f e c t t o t h a t i n t e n t i o n i f i t can be dor <-• i n s i s t e n t l y w i t h 
l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s . To do t h i s i t h a s b e e n h e l d t h a t t h e C o u r t s 
m u s t c o n s i d e r n o t o n l y t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e c o n t r a c t , b u t t h e 
f a c t s » * • unding c I r c 1 1 m s t a n c e s unde.1 : whi c 1 1 th< •. n t r a c t was 
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made. 175 ALR 30 Ruysser v^ Smith, 293 SW2d 930 MO., 41 Am Jur 
2d 69 7, §13: 
"...It has also been said that all fair doubts are 
to be resolved in favor of the indemnitee. On the 
other hand, in some jurisdictions it has been held 
that indemnity agreements are strictly construed 
against one who claims to be an indemnitee. But 
whatever the rule may be otherwise, where the 
indemnitee's contract has been drawn by the 
indemnitor, the general principle of contract law— 
that a contract, when ambiguous or uncertain, is 
construed most strongly against TTTe party who pre-
pared iT^-is applicable to indemnity contracts." 
(41 Am Jur 2nd 698 '§13) (Emphasis added! 
As to notice, the general rule is clear that where 
notice to the indemnitor is required by the terms of the 
contract, it must be given. 41 Am Jur 2d 340 p.730. This rule is 
cited favorably in appellants brief, thus should be followed in 
this case. Paragraph 13 of the indemnity agreement gives the 
indemnitors the right to post security with the surety and 
require the surety to litigate claims or demands which the surety 
otherwise could settle. The rights given to the indemnitors by 
this paragraph would be meaningless if the indemnitors were not 
aware of the claims. There is no dispute that Maureen Nelson did 
not know about the claims of the appellants and AAA, and that 
appellants knew that she had not been given notice of those 
claims, thus, notice should have been given to her. No notice 
was given, thus plaintiff's claim fails and the trial court was 
correct in its ruling. 
There are cases which have held that where no notice 
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i s r e q u i r e d b y t h e c: o n I: r a c t « :> i w h e i: e n o t i • ^ • s w a i v e d , t h a t 
n o t i c e i s no t n e c e s s a r y t o f i x t h e l i a b i l i t y r the i n d e m n i t o r . 
McCormick v . B o y l a n , 83 CT 686 78 A t l a n t i c 335 ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 41 Am Jur 
§40 730. However, none of t h e s e c a s e s i n v o l v e t h e compr > m i se o f 
c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s b e l o n g i n g t o t h e i n d e m n i t o r s . F u r t h e r m o r e , 
the more re ::ei i t and b e t t e r reasoned c a s e s have he ld that where 
an indemnitor has no t been g i v e n n o t i c e of the s u i t a g a i n s t h i s 
i n d e m n i t e e , t h e f a i l u r e o f n o t i c e c h a n g e s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f 
and imposes upoi I t h e indemni t e e t h e • n e c e s s i t y of a g a i n l i t i g a t i n g 
and e s t a b l i s h i n g a l l o f t h e a c t i o n a l f a c t s t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l 
o b l i g e e had a g a i n s t t h e p r i n c i p a l . C i t i n g 42 CJS § 3 2 ( 2 ) p . 6 1 8 . 
McArthur v . G a i n s , 28 6 £ . - . : • • • ^nn. ( 1 9 ] 3 ) . Pan A m e r i c a n 
P e t r o l e u m Corp. v . Maddux W e l l S e r v i c e , W Y" 5 86 P2d 2 0, 122 0 
( 1 9 7 8 ) , C h e n e y v^ Cj^J/ oji. Mounta in , Lake T e r r a c e , 20 WA App 8 5 4 , 
583 P2d 1242 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Feuer v^ Menkes F e u e r I n c . , 187 NYS 2d 116 ; 
D e l a w a r e <& Aderondack F a r m e r s Co-op Exchange I n c . , 30 6 NYS 2d 
10 0 2 . Un d e r s u c h a r i i ] e ., a p p e ] ] a n t s c a s e w o u l d f a i 1 a g a i n s t 
Maureen N e l s o n , b e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t s n e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o show any 
breach of the c o n t r a c t which AAA E l e c t r i c had w i t h the FAA. 
Most of tl: ie c a s e s whi ch I: l a v e I i e ] < :I t h a t n o t i c e o f t h e 
c l a i m i s n o t a r e q u i r e m e n t t o p r o v e t h e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e 
indemni tee have done so on t h e t h e o r y t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c l a i m 
i s as much w i t h i n the knowledge of t h e indemni tor a s t h e s u r e t y . 
Ward v^ Henry , 5 CT 5 9 5 , 74 Am Jur 2d 119 § 1 7 0 . I t i s o b v i o u s 
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that such was not true in the instant case, as respondent had 
absolutely no knowledge of the existence of the claims and the 
appellants were well aware of that factf as they knew that the 
Nelsons were having domestic difficulties and that Mrs* Nelson 
was not actively involved in any of the claims. Appellants, on 
the other hand, had their own attorney on the case and had 
knowledge or the means to acquire knowledge of the facts 
concerning the claims. 
To imply, as the appellant does in its brief, that 
because Keith Nelson was given notice of all important events, that 
the rights of Mrs. Nelson were protected by Mr. Nelson is not in 
any way supported by the record, because, when it came time to 
pursue the appeals, Mr. Nelson, for his own reasons, chose to 
ignore them, in the same manner as he chose not to appeal the 
judgment rendered in the instant case. Mrs. Nelson would have 
been able, through the coercive power of a divorce court to 
require that Mr. Nelson pursue the appeals or she could have 
pursued the appeals herself by the use of witnesses upon the job 
other than. Mr. Nelson. By failing to give her notice of the 
declaration of default by the FAA, against AAA firstly, the 
appellants secondly, the filing of the appeals of those claims, 
and the compromising of the claims totalling $200,000.00 for 
$30,000.00 in contract proceeds and extras, the bonding 
companies left Mrs. Nelson at the mercy of Mr. Nelson at a time 
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when the appellants knew that the Me 1 sons were having 3omestic 
problems and it would be a reasonable assumption that Mr. Nelson 
would not be revealing to Mrs. Nelson the fact that he was 
ignoring a duty to protect her as an indemnitor. Fur 111e t , 
plaintiffs could not assume under any circumstances that Keith 
Nelson was ai : agent of Mai ireei 1 Nel son si i: ice they di d not do so in 
the signing of the original agreement. 
In order for an. notice to comply with the require-
ments of Paragraph 13 and .n:i-i. - of 
the parties, Maureen Nelson, should have been made aware of the 
nature of the claims bi the sureties and AAA against the FAA or 
that an appeal existed from a particular judgment or decision. 
No notice was given to Mrs, Nelson of the proposed settlement 
which settle! I.MI £ I n,(in D.IMI, <M,um^ ot l? Jl)n,niHUin, gainst™ the 
FAA. While it could be argued that the appellants did the best 
that they could under the circumstances/ there were several 
factors which weighed against such an errquiiient First, Mi. 
Vanatta could not recall whether or not he was licensed to 
practice before the Appeals Board before which the appeals were 
to be heard. Thus, his opinion as to whether or not the appeals 
would be successful would be entitled to little, if any weight. 
Secondly, the conduct of the appellants in settling $61,410.00 of 
money due under the contract for government reprocurement costs 
and claimed damages by the government which were never proved at 
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trial (R. 277, L. 1-17), would give rise to substantial questions 
as to the reasonableness of the entire settlement by the 
appellants of the extras which totalled over $140,000.00. 
It is submitted that the wording of paragraph 13 of 
the indemnity agreement implicitly, but quite clearly required 
notice to the indemnitors; otherwise, the rights it gives the 
indemnitors are as meaningless as the Roman laws printed at the 
top of the pillars during the Roman Empire. The trial Court so 
found. While such a decision is reviewable on appeal, it is 
impossible to reason how a person in the position of Maureen 
Nelson would have any rights under said paragraph if she did not 
know about those rights and the only practical way for her to 
have knowledge would be to receive notice thereof from the entity 
who ultimately settled the claims and appeals. In addition, the 
undisputed conduct of the parties showed an intent to give notice 
to the indemnitors. Under the general rule cited by appellants, 
that if notice is required by the contract and not given, no 
liability will accrue to the indemnitors, Maureen Nelson is not 
liable for the loss. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR MAUREEN NELSON TO 
SHOW PREJUDICE IN THE ABSENCE OF NOTICE. 
Appellant cites 42 CJS 593 §15, for the proposition 
that the indemnitee must show prejudice because of the delay in 
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notice. The case of Aetna Bank v. Hollister, 10 ATI.550 (1886) 
is cited by appellant for this proposition. No further or more 
recent cases since 1886 propounding this ruling are found. The 
bond in that case specifically provided that no notice to the 
obligor was necessary. (See page 554 of the opinion). At page 
555/ the Court ruled that because "of the strong provisions of 
the bondf we do not think the above facts constitute a defense." 
The Court ruled further that the defendant, where the agreement 
provided that no notice was required, must show estoppel on the 
part of the obligee, which was missing in that case. The point 
is that the actual holding of this case does not stand for the 
proposition cited. The agreement in question, rather than 
requiring notice as set forth in appellants brief, explicitly 
provided that no notice was required, thus this case is not 
applicable to the instant case. 
Further, the case of Weaver Bros., Inc., v. Chappel, 
684 P2d 123 (AK 1984) cited by appellant involved the opposite 
relationship of parties to the instant case, ie: an insurance 
company invoking its notice requirement to defeat coverage to a 
lay person. The Alaska Supreme Court, noting that insurance 
contracts were contracts of adhesion and further, that because 
information as to prejudice was more readily available to 
insurors than the insured, ruled that the insuror be required to 
show prejudice in order to invoke lack of notice as a defense to 
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an act ion for th i rd party contribution* In the ins tan t case f the 
p r i n c i p l e s of Weaver would de fea t the a p p e l l a n t s because 
appel lant was in control of the jobs, the claims and the appeals. 
Maureen Nelson had no such in fo rmat ion nor was she informed of 
such mat ters u n t i l the appel lants had negotiated away a l l of her 
r i g h t s . At the t r i a l of the i n s t a n t c a s e , i t was the bonding 
company who had a l l of the documentation of the claims and the i r 
mer i t s who refused to produce fur ther documents or did not know 
and could not prove the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of the v a r i o u s c l a i m s . 
F u r t h e r , when Mrs. Nelson a t t empted to t e s t i f y as to what she 
would have done if p rope r ly n o t i f i e d , she was squelched by the 
o b j e c t i o n by a p p e l l a n t s t h a t such was s p e c u l a t i o n . (R. 203). 
How can the a p p e l l a n t s now be heard to say t h a t she f a i l e d to 
show how she was prejudiced by lack of notice? 
The case of Hal lsey v. F i reman ' s Fund I n s . , Co., 6 81 
P2d 168 (OR App. 1984), c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t s was a l s o ano the r 
au tomobi le insurance n o t i c e case where a t r i a l c o u r t , on the 
s o l e a s s e r t i o n of lack of n o t i c e , ru l ed as a m a t t e r of law t h a t 
t he insured was not e n t i t l e d to coverage . The a p p e l l a t e cour t 
merely ru l ed t h a t t h e r e was an i s s u e of f a c t and remanded the 
case for t r i a l . 
The case of Thompson v. Grange Insurance Assn, 6 60 P2d 
307 (1984) i s a l s o an insurance case r e q u i r i n g t h a t p r e j u d i c e be 
shown by the insurance company for delay in no t i ce . 
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A reading of all of the foregoing cases, cited by 
appellants compels any reader to ask what any of these courts 
would have done had the insureds in those cases failed to give 
notice to the insurance companies and litigated the cases to the 
appellate level, settled alleged claims for specified sums, 
then turned to the insuror and and requested reimbursement 
without any evidence, on an item by item basis, as to the 
relative merits or demerits of the claims. They would be 
defeated as the appellants were defeated below. 
It is apparent from the record and obvious from the 
ruling of the trial court that the trial court felt that Maureen 
Nelson was, in fact prejudiced by the actions of the appellants. 
In the insurance notice cases cited by appellants, the issue was 
whether or not the mere passage of time without notice to the 
carrier resulted in prejudice to the insuror. In none of these 
cases had any of the rights of the insurance carriers to defend 
been negotiated away by the insured. In the instant case, the 
appellants had negotiated all terms of a takeover agreement, 
whereby they took over the bonded jobs; then had allowed 
themselves to be declared in default by the FAA; made claims 
against the FAA, tried those claims, appealed them, then settled 
all of the claims finally and irrevocably with the FAA, all 
without notice to Maureen Nelson. 
To say as appellants do, that Maureen Nelson has not 
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been prejudiced after the appellants have negotiated away any and 
all contract rights that she would have had as an indemnitor 
for seven cents on the dollar, and have no real evidence of the 
precise reasons for such a compromise staggers the imagination 
and lacks common business sense. 
POINT III 
THE ACTIONS OF THE BONDING COMPANY IN SETTLING 
ALL CLAIMS OF THE PRINCIPAL AGAINST THE OBLIGEE 
WAS A DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL PURSUANT TO THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN THE STATE OF COLORADO 
REQUIRING THAT NOTICE BE GIVEN TO ANY DEBTORS 
THEREUNDER. 
The I n d e m n i t y A g r e e m e n t i n t h e t h i r d p a r a g r a p h 
t h e r e o f c r e a t e s an a s s i g n m e n t a s c o l l a t e r a l of a l l r i g h t s of t h e 
p r i n c i p a l and i n d e m n i t o r s o r any of them g r o w i n g o u t of any and 
a l l c o n t r a c t s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e bond , a l l m a c h i n e r y , e q u i p m e n t , 
t o o l s and m a t e r i a l s a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e , a l l r i g h t , t i t l e 
and i n t e r e s t of t h e p r i n c i p a l and i n d e m n i t o r s t o a l l s u b -
c o n t r a c t s , a l l c a u s e s o f a c t i o n s , c l a i m s o r demand o f t h e 
p r i n c i p a l s a g a i n s t any s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s , l a b o r e r s , m a t e r i a l s o r 
any o t h e r p e r s o n s , f i r m s o r c o r p o r a t i o n s a g r e e i n g t o f u r n i s h o r 
s u p p l y l a b o r , m a t e r i a l s , s u p p l i e s a n d m a c h i n e r y u p o n t h e 
c o n t r a c t , and any and a l l p e r c e n t a g e s r e t a i n e d and any and a l l 
sums t h a t may be due on a l l c o n t r a c t s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e bond. 
The f i f t h p a r a g r a p h of t he a g r e e m e n t p r o v i d e s t h a t 
t h a t a g r e e m e n t s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a s e c u r i t y a g r e e m e n t t o t h e 
s u r e t y and a f i n a n c i n g s t a t e m e n t t o comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 
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the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Further , the Indemnity Agreement has been in fact 
stamped as being recorded in the State of Colorado as a secur i ty 
agreement. 
§4-9-504(3) Colorado Revised S t a t u t e s , CRS 1973 r e -
q u i r e s t h a t n o t i c e be given of the d i s p o s i t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l 
under secured t ransac t ions . Under Colorado law, if there was no 
n o t i c e p r i o r to s a l e of the c o l l a t e r a l , i t i s presumed t h a t the 
va lue of the c o l l a t e r a l sold was equal to the balance owing on 
the agreement of the debtor . Community Management Association of 
Colorado S p r i n g s , Inc . v. Tousley , 32 CO App 33, 505 P2d 1314 
(1973); United Bank of Denver v. Reed, CO App 635 P2d 922 (1981). 
Under §4-9-50K3) (d) CRS 1973, n o t i c e r equ i remen t s of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, as to d i spos i t ions of c o l l a t e r a l 
cannot be waived and the Supreme Court of Colorado has so ruled. 
See F i r s t Na t iona l Bank v^ C i l l e s s e n , CO App 62 2 P2d 59 8 (1980); 
t h u s p a r a g r a p h 11 which p u r p o r t s t o waive n o t i c e to the 
indemnitors i s not e f fec t ive . 
The appel lants as the assignee of. the contract r i g h t s , 
a secured p a r t y , s e t t l e d the claimed amounts due from the FAA 
upon the c o n t r a c t s of approximate ly $200,000 for a t o t a l of 
$30,000, and thereby d isposed of the c o l l a t e r a l owned by AAA 
without any notice whatsoever to Mrs. Nelson, thus i t i s presumed 
under Colorado law t h a t any ba lance owed by Mrs. Nelson was 
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discharged since no independent evidence of value was presented 
at the trial. 
The case of Wiley v. Bank of Fountain Valley, Colo App. 
632 P2d 282 (1981) is most appropriate to this case because it 
involved the sale of a promissory note having a face value of 
$39,672.26 for $10,000.00 with notice of the sale having been 
given once, so the debtor knew that the note was going to be 
sold. The sale was then continued, with conflicting evidence of 
whether or not notice was sent of the new sale. The trial court 
directed as a matter of law that notice had been given and 
entered a deficiency judgment fo the secured party ruling that 
the dispositions of security were reasonable as a matter of law. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, 
sending the case back for a new trial both as to notice and 
citing the Tousley case supra for the proposition that the 
secured party assumed the burden of proving the value of the 
security by a manner other than the price of obtained in its 
sale, and further noted that if the jury found that no notice was 
sent, without further proof as to the value of the security the 
presumption was that the security was sold for the total amount 
owed. 
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POINT IV 
THE SETTLEMENT BY APPELLANTS OF THE CONTRACT 
CLAIMS OF THE PRINCIPAL, AAAf AGAINST THE FAA 
WAS A DISPOSITION OF CONTRACT RIGHTS REQUIRING 
APPELLANTS TO PROCEED IN A COMMERCIALLY REASON-
ABLE MANNER AND APPELLANTS FAILED TO MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO WHAT IS COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE. 
§4-9-502 of the Colorado Revised Statutes in 1973, 
sub-section 2 thereof provides as follows: 
"(2) A secured party, who by agreement is entitled 
to charge back on collected collateral or otherwise 
to full or limited recourse against the debtor and to 
undertakes to collect from the account debtors or 
obligors must proceed in £ commercially reasonable 
manner and may deduct KTs reasonable expenses ot 
realization from the collections. If the security 
agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party 
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and un-
less otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any 
deficiency." 
In the instant case, the plaintiff did not put on any 
evidence of what was a commercially reasonable manner in which 
to proceed in collecting the receivables and contract rights of 
AAA Electric. The witness, Mr. Vanatta, when questioned on the 
specifics of the claims and their merits could not recall any 
specific facts of the various claims, nor did this witness or any 
other witness for the plaintiffs testify as to what was commer-
cially reasonable in the construction industry in disposing of 
contract rights and receivables under Government contracts. 
Furthermore, there was no proof that Mr. Vanatta was licensed to 
practice before the Federal Board of Appeals before which the 
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c l a i m s were f i l e d upon t h e a p p e a l s . When a s k e d such a q u e s t i o n 
h e s t a t e d t h a t h e c o u l d n o t r e m e m b e r . How c o u l d s u c h a p e r s o n 
g i v e t e s t i m o n y of t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of s u c c e s s f o r an a p p e a l ? I t 
was t h e b u r d e n of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r o v e t h a t t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of 
c o l l a t e r a l was c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e u n d e r a l l t h e c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s i f n o t i c e i s no t g i v e n , t h u s t h e t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t 
i n i t s r u l i n g . 
CONCLUSION 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i n o r d e r f o r t h e 
e f f e c t i v e t e r m s of t h e i n d e m n i t y a g r e e m e n t t o have any m e a n i n g , 
n o t i c e of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t r i g h t s and c l a i m s had t o 
be g i v e n t o Maureen N e l s o n ; f u r t h e r , t h e a p p e l l a n t gave n o t i c e 
of t h o s e r i g h t s and o t h e r r i g h t s t o t h e c o - i n d e m n i t o r who was 
k n o w l e d g a b l e o f t h o s e c l a i m s a n d c o n d u c t e d i t s e l f i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t n o t i c e t o t h e i n d e m n i t o r was 
r e q u i r e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t . F u r t h e r , t h e c o n t r a c t r i g h t s w e r e 
s e c u r i t y u n d e r t h e C o l o r a d o C o m m e r c i a l Code w h i c h p r o h i b i t s 
w a i v e r of n o t i c e of s a l e o r d i s p o s i t i o n of c o l l a t e r a l and 
f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t i f no n o t i c e of d i s p o s i t i o n i s g i v e n , t h e 
c o l l a t e r a l i s p resumed t o e q u a l t h e amount owed. No e v i d e n c e of 
a c o m m e r c i a l l y r e a s o n a b l e method of s a l e or v a l u e was adduced a t 
t h e t r i a l , t h u s t h e a p p e l l a n t s c l a i m a g a i n s t Maureen Nelson was 
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